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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

CODE OF LEGAL ETHICS ADOPTED BY THE KENTUCKY STATE BAR ASSOCIATION.
i. The respect enjoined by law for courts and judicial officers
is exacted for the sake of the office, and not for the individual who
administers it. Bad opinions of the incumbent, however well founded,
can not excuse the withholding of the respect due the office, while
administering its functions.
2. The proprieties of the judicial station, in a great measure
disable the judge from defending himself against strictures upon
his official conduct. For this reason, and because such criticism
tend to impair public confidence in the administration of justice. attorneys should, as a rule, refrain from published criticisms of judicial
conduct, especially in reference to causes in which they have been of
counsel, otherwise than in courts of review, or when the conduct of
a judge is necessarily involved in determining his removal from or
continuance in office.
3. Marked attention and unusual hospitality to a judge, when
the relations of the parties are such that they would not otherwise
be extended, subject both judges and attorneys to misconstructions,
and should be sedulously avoided. A self-respecting independence in
the discharge of the attorney's duties, which at the same time does
not withhold the courtesy and respects due the judge's station, is the
only just foundation for cordial personal and official relations between
bench and bar. All attempts by means beyond these to gain special
personal consideration and favor of a judge are disreputable.
4. Courts and judicial officers, in the rightful exercise of their
functions, should always receive the support and countenance of
attorneys against unjust criticisms and popular clamor; and it is an
attorney's duty to give them his moral support in all proper ways,
and particularly by setting a good example in his own person of
obedience to law.
5. The utmost candor and fairness should characterize the
dealings of attorneys with the courts and with each other. Knowingly
citing as authority an overruled case, or treating a repealed statute
as in existence-knowingly misquoting the language of a decision
or text-book-knowingly misstating the contents of a paper, the testimony of a witness, or the language or argument of opposite counseloffering evidence which it is known the court must reject as illegal,
to get it before the jury, under the guise of arguing its admissibilityand all kindred practices are deceits and evasions unworthy of attorneys.
Purposly concealing or withholding in the opening argument
positions intended finally to be relied upon, in order that opposite
counsel may not discuss them, is unprofessional.
In the argument of demurrers, admission of evidence and other
questions of law, counsel should carefully refrain from "side-bar"
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remarks and sparring discourse, to influence the jury or bystanders.
Personal colloquies between counsel tend to delay, and promote unseemly wrangling, and ought to be discouraged.
6. Attorneys owe it to the courts and the public, whose business
the courts transact, as well as to their own clients, to be punctual in
attendance on their causes.
7. One side must always lose the cause; and it is not wise or
respectful to the court, for attorneys to display temper because of
an adverse ruling.
S. An attorney should strive, at all times, to uphold the honor,
maintain the dignity, and promote the usefulness of the profession;
for it is so interwoven with the administration of justice that whatever
redounds to the good of one advances the other; and the attorney thus
discharges, not merely an obligation to his brother, but a high duty to
the State and his fellow man.
9. An attorney should not speak slightingly or disparagingly
of his profession, or pander in any way to unjust popular prejudices
against it; and he should scrupulously refrain at all times, and in all
relations of life, from availing himself .of any prejudice or popular
misconception against lawyers, in order to carry a point against a
brother attorney.
1o. Nothing has been more potential in creating and pandering
to the popular prejudice against lawyers as a class than the false
claim, often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable
transactions, that it is an attorney's duty to do everything to succeed
in his client's cause.
An attorney owes entire devotion to the interests of his client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his cause, and the
exertion of the utmost skill and ability, to the end that nothing may
be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No sacrifice or peril, even to the loss of life itself, can absolve
from the fearless discharge of this duty. Nevertheless, it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust is to be performed
within and not without, the bounds of law, which creates it. The attorney's office does not destroy man's accountability to his Creator,
or lossen the duty of obedience to law, and the obligation to his
neighbor; and it does not permit, much less demand, violation of law,
or any manner of fraud or chicanery for the client's sake.
ii. Attorneys should fearlessly expose before the proper tribunals corrupt or dishonest conduct in the profession; and there should
never be any hesitancy in accepting employment against an attorney
who has wronged his client.
12. An attorney appearing or continuing as private counsel in
the prosecution for a crime of which he believes the accused innocent,
forswears himself. The commonwealth's attorney is criminal if lie
presses for a conviction, when upon the evidence he believes the
prisoner innocent. If the evidence is not pl'ain enough to justify a
nolle presequi, a public prosecutor should submit the case, with such
comments as are pertinent, accompanied by a candid statement of
his own doubts.
13. An attorney is not bound to reject the defense of a person
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accused of a criminal offense, because he believes him guilty. It i.
his duty, by all fair and lawful means, to present such defenses as thlaw of the land permits-to the end that no one may be deprived of
life or liberty, but by due process of law.
14. An attorney must decline in a civil cause to conduct a prosecution when satisfied that the purpose is merely to harass or injure
the opposite party, or to work oppression and wrong.
15. It is a bad practice for an attorney to communicate or
argue privately with the judge as to the merits of his cause.
16. Newspaper advertisements, circulars and business cards.
tendering professional services to the general public, while not improper, are to be dealt in sparingly; but special solicitatioi of particular individuals to become clients is highly objectionable. Indirect
advertisement for business, by furnishing or inspiring editorial or
nress notices, regarding causes in which the attorney takes part, the
manner in which they were conducted, the importance of his positions,
the magnitude of the interests involved, and all other like self-laudation, is of evil tendency and wholly unprofessional.
17. Newspaper publications and interviews by an attorney as
to the merits of pending or anticipated litigation call forth discussions
and reply from the opposite party, tend to prevent a fair trial in the
courts, and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice. It
requires a strong case to justify such publications; and, when proper,
it is unprofessional to make them annoymously. It is better that all
newspaper reports of court proceedings be taken, as far as may be,
from the records and papers on file in the court.
18. When an attorney is a witness for his client, except as to
formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of an instrument,
and the like, he should leave the trial of the cause to other counsel.
Except when essential to the ends of justice, an attorney should
scrupulously avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client, as to
any matter.
19. Assertions, sometimes made by counsel in argument, or a
personal belief of the client's innocence, or the justice of his cause,
are to be discouraged.
20. It is indecent to hunt up defects in titles, and the like and
inform thereof, in order to be employed to bring suit; or to seek out
a person supposed to have a cause of action, and endeavor to get a fee
to litigate about it. Except where ties of blood relationship or trust,
make it an attorney's duty, it is unprofessional to volunteer advice
to bring a law suit. Stirring up strife and litigation is forbidden by
law, and disreputable in morals.
21. Communications and confidence between client and attorney
are the property and secrets of the client; and can not be divulged,
except at his instance; even the death of the client does not absolve
the attorney from his obligation of secrecy.
22. The duty not to divulge the secrets of clients extends further
than mere silence by the attorney, and forbids accepting retainers or
employment afterward from others involving the client's interest, in
the matters about which the confidence was reposed. When the secrets
or confidence of a former client may be availed of or be material, in a
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subseauent suit, as the basis of any judgment which may injuriously
affect his riights. the attorney can not appear in such cause without the
consent of his former client.
23. An attorney can never attack an instrument or paper drawn
by him for any infirmity apparent on its face; nor for any other
cause where confidence has been reposed as to the facts- concerning it.
Where the attorney acted as a mere scrivener, and was not consulted
as to the facts, and, unknown to him the transaction amounted- to a
violation of the laws. he may assail it on that ground, in suits between
third persons, or between parties to the instrument and strangers.
24. An attorney openly, and in his true character as such, may
render professional services regarding proposed legislation, and in
advocacy of claims before the departments of the government, unon
the same principles of ethics which justify his appearance before the
-ourts; but it is improper for any attorney so engaged to conceal
his attorneyship, or to do any act, or to use means other than those
,aadressed to the reason and understanding, to influence action.
?r. An attorney can never represent conflicting interests in the
same suit or transaction, except by express consent of all so concerned,
with full knowledge of the facts. Even then, such a position is embarrassing, and ought to be avoided. An attorney represents conflicting interests, within the meaning of this rule; when it is his duty
in behalf of one of his clients, to contend for that, which duty to other
clients in the transaction requires him to oppose.
26. It is not a desirable professional reputation to live and die
with-that of a rough tongue, which makes a man to be sought out
and retained to gratify the malevolent feeling of a suitor in hearing
the other side well lashed and vilified.
27. An attorney is under no obligation to minister to the malevolence or prejudice of a client in the trial or conduct of a cause. The
client can not be made the keeper of the attorney's conscience in professional matters. He can not demand as of right that his attorney
shall abuse the opposite party, or indulge in offensive personalities.
The attorney, under the solemnity of his oath, must determine for
himself whether such a course is essential to ends of justice, and
therefore justifiable.
28. Clients, and not their attorneys, are the litigants; and whatever may be the ill feeling existing between clients, it is unprofessional for attorneys to partake of it in their conduct and demeanor to
each other, or to suitors in the case.
29. In the conduct of litigation and the trial of causes the attot neys should try the merits of the cause and not try each other. It
is not proper to allude to, or comment upon, the personal history, or
mental or physical peculiarities or idiosyncracies of opposite counsel.
Personalities should always be avoided, and the utmost courtesy always extended to an honorable opponent.
3o. As to incidental matters pending the trial, not affecting the
merits of the cause, or working substantial prejudice to the rights of
the client, such as forcing the opposite attorney to trial when he is
under affliction or bereavement; forcing the trial on a particular day
to the serious injury of the opposite attorney, when no harm will
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result from a trial at a different time; the time allowed for signing a
bill of exceptions, crossing interrogatories, and the like, the attorney
must be allowed to judge. No client has a right to demand that his
attorney shall be illiberal in such matters, or that he should do anything therein repugnant to his own sdnse of honor and propriety;
and if such a course is insisted upon, the attorney should retire from
the cause.
31. The miscarriages to which justice is subject, and the uncertainty of predicting results, admonish attorneys to beware of bold
and confident assurance to clients, especially where the employment
depends upon the assurance, and the case is not plain.
32.
Prompt preparation for trial, punctuality in answering letters
and keeping engagements are due from an attorney to his clients and
do much to strengthen their confidence and friendship.
33. An attorney is in honor bound to disclose to the client at
the time of the retainer all circumstances of his relation to the parties,
or interests or connection with the controversy, which might justly
influence the client in the selection of his attorney. He must decline
to appear in any cause where his obligations or relations to the opposite parties will hinder or seriously embarrass the full and fearless
discharge of all his duties.
34. An attorney should endeavor to obtain full knowledge of
his client's cause before advising him, and is bound to give him a
candid opinion of the merits and probable result of his cause. When
the controversy will admit of it he ought to seek to adjust it without
litigation, if practicable.
35. Money or other trust property coming into the possession of
the attorney, should be promptly reported, and never commingled
with his private property or used by him, except with the client's
knowledge and consent.
36. Attorneys should, as far as possible, avoid becoming either
borrowers or creditors of their client; and they ought scrupulously to
refrain from bargaining about the subject-matter of the litigation, so
long as the relation of attorney and client continues.
37. Natural solicitude of clients often prompts them to offer
assistance of additional counsel. This should not be met, as it sometimes is, as evidence of want of confidence; but after advising frankly
with the client, it should be left to his determination.
38. Important agreements affecting the rights of clients should,
as far as possible, be reduced to writing; but it is dishonorable to
avoid performance of an agreement fairly made, because not reduced
to writing as required by rules of court or otherwise.
39. An attorney should not, even when the law permits, ignore
known customs of practice of the bar of a particular court, where
such practice has been long established and generally acquiesced in.
If any other course is contemplated, timely notice should be given
opposing counsel.
40. An attorney ought not to engage in discussion or arguments
about the merits of the case with the opposite party without notice
to his attorneys; and should not attempt to compromise with the
opposite party without notifying his attorney, if practicable.
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41. When attorn6ys jointly associated in a cause can not agree
as to any matter vital to the interest'of their client, the course to be
pursued should be left to his determination. The client's decision
.should be cheerfully acquiesced in, unless the nature of the difference
makes it impracticable for the attorney to co-operate heartily and
effectively, in which event it is his duty to ask to be discharged.
42. Satisfactory relations between attorney and client are best
preserved by a frank and explicit understanding at the outset, as
to the amount of the attorney 's compensation, and, where it is possible,
this should always be agreed on in advance.
43. In general, it is better to yield something to a client's dissatisfaction at the amount of the fee, though the sum be reasonable,
than to engage in a law suit to justify it, which ought always to be
avoided, except as a last resort to prevent imposition or fraud.
44. In fixing fees the following elements should be considered:
ist, The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to properly conduct the
cause. 2. Whether the particular case will debar the attorney's appearance for others in cases likely to arise out of the transaction, and
in which there is a reasonable expectation that the attorney would
otherwise be employed; and herein of the loss of other business while
employed in the particular case and the antagonism with other clients
growing out of the employment. 3. The customary charges of the
bar for similar services. 4. The real amount involved and the benefits
resulting from the services. 5. Whether the compensation be contingent or assured. 6. Is the client a regular one, retaining the attorney in all his business?
No one of these considerations is in itself controlling. They
are mere guides in ascertaining what the particular service is really
worth; and in fixing the amount, it should never be forgotten that
the profession is a branch of the administration of justice and not a
mere money-getting- trade.
45. Contingent fees may be contracted for; but they lead to
many abuses, and certain compensation is to be preferred.
46. Casual and slight services should be rendered without charge
by one attorney to another in his personal cause; but when the service
goes beyond this an attorney may be charged as other clients.
Ordinary advice and service to the family of a deceased attorney
should be rendered without charge in most instances; and where the
circumstances make it proper to charge, the fees should generally be
less than in case of other clients.
47. Witnesses and suitors should be treated with firmness and
kindness. When essential to the ends of justice to arraign their conduct or testimony, it should be done without vilification or unnecessary harshness. Fierceness of manner and uncivil behavior can add
nothing to the truthful dissection of a false witness' testimony and
often rob deserved strictures of proper weight.
48. It is the duty of the court and its officers to provide for
the comfort of jurors. Displaying special concern for their comfort,
and volunteering to ask favors for them, while they are present-such
as frequent motions to adjourn trials, to take recess, solely on the
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ground of the jury's fatigue, or hunger, and uncomfortableness of
their seats or the court room, and the like, should be avoided. Such
intervention of attorneys, when proper, ought to be had privately with
the court; thereby there will be no appearance of fawning upon the
jury, nor ground for ill feeling of the jury towards the court or opposite counsel, if such requests are denied. For like reasons, one
attorney should never ask another, in the presence of the jury, to
consent to its discharge or dispersion; and when such a request is
made by the court, the attorneys, without indicating their preference,
should ask to be heard after the jury withdraws. And, as a general
thing, propositions from counsel to dispense with argument should
be made and discussed out of the hearing of the jury.
49. An attorney ought never to converse privately with jurors
about the case; and must avoid all unnecessary communication, even
as to matters foreign to the cause, both before and during the trial.
Any other course, no matter how blameless the attorney's motives,
gives color to the imputing of evil designs, and often leads to scandal
in the administration of justice.
50. An attorney assigned as counsel for an indigent prisoner
ought not to ask to be excused for any light cause, and should always
be a friend to the defenseless and oppressed.
51. The lawyer should study the law with the constant purpose
to do what he can to amend and perfect it.
52. Except upon the ground that a moral principle is involved,
an attorney ought never to counsel or approve the infraction or
evasion of a valid law. The fact that the end to be gained is a
political one will not justify any departure from this rule.
53. While 'an attorney should speak respectfully of the judiciary
and of all lawfully constituted authorities; and in the trial of causes
and in all his dealings with the court should demean himself towards
it with deference and respect, he has, on the other hand, a right to
expect and exact from the court the same demeanor towards himself.
It is unfortunate for the cause of justice when the judge forgets his
dependence on the bar and forgets to pay it the deference and respect
which is its due.
54. The qualities desirable in a judge are courtesy, affability,
even temper, patience, conscientiousness, legal learning, sound sense
and judgment, the moral courage to meet an issue squarely, and an
impartial mind.
55. The bar should never permit political considerations to outweigh judicial fitness in selecting material for the bench, and it
should earnestly and actively protest against the appointment or election of those who, in the general estimation of the bar, are unsuitable
for the bench.
0

Putting It Clearly.-"Rastus, what's an alibi?"
"Dat's provin' dat yoh was at a prayer meetin' whar yoh wasn't
in order to show dat yoh wasn't at de crap game whar yoh was."--Life.

